NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project. Paper 62: The Influence of Knowledge Diffusion on Aeronautics Innovation: The Research, Development, and Production of Large Commercial Aircraft in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom by Golich, Vicki L. & Pinelli, Thomas E.
NASA-TIq-112643
NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge
Diffusion Research Project
"',_-_; _"_"-Paper Sixty ,Two
- . =
lnfleU" _: The nceof__Knowledge Diffusion on Aeronautics Innovation:
_- The Res_nreh, Development, and Production of Large Commercial
.... Aircraft in France_ Germany, and the United Kingdom.
; Paperpresented at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's Aviation
_ _- Safety Syrr_: Aviation Communication - A Multi-Cultural Forum
...... heldApN 9-•1i__-1'_997,at the Davis Looming Center on the Prescott,
Arizona Ca_ of Embrg-Riddle Aeronautical University\
J
. : -. ViCki L. Golich _-
_ _ California StateUniversity, San Marcos
San Marcos. CA
i
, _ "L |
2 - 2
• - Thomas E.)Pinelli
:, ,,/ - . NASA L,angley_esearch Center
Hampton, Virginia
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Department of Defense
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
\/! / j:-, _..__. it_
i
J/
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19970019003 2020-06-16T01:51:52+00:00Z

THE INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION ON
AERONAUTICS INNOVATION:
THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION
OF LARGE COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT IN
FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Vicki L. Golich
Associate Professor, Political Science
California State University San Marcos
333 South Twin Oaks Valley Road
San Marcos, CA 92096-0001
760.750.4144 (V)
760.750.3284 (F)
vgolich@mailhost I .csusm.edu
by
Thomas E. Pinelli
Head, Visual Imaging Branch
NASA Langley Research Center
Mail Code - 400
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
757.864.2491 (V)
757.864.8311 (F)
t.e.pinelli@larc.nasa.gov
PaperpreparedfordeliveryattheAviationCommunication;A Multi-CulturalForum Conference,Prescott,AZ, April 11,
1997. The researchforthis paperwas partiallysupportedbythe NASA/DODAerospaceKnow edge DiffusionResearch
Project.

ABSTRACT
Thispaperfocusesonhow Europeanpublicpolicies--individuallyand collectively
--influencethe diffusionof knowledgeandtechnology. It beginswith an overview
of the roles played historicallyand currentlyby European governmentsin the
research,development,andproduction(RD&P) of largecommercial aircraft(LCA).
Theanaly'dcalframework bringstogetherliteraturefromglobal politicaleconomy,
comparativepolitics,businessmanagement,and scienceand technologypolicy
studies. It distinguishesbetweenthe productionof knowledge,onthe one hand,
and the disseminationof knowledge,on the other. France, Germany, and the
UnitedKingdomserveasthe analyticalcases. The paperconcludeswith a call for
additionalresearchinthis area, sometentativelessonsleamed, and a discussion
of the consequencesof national strategies and policies for the diffusion of
knowledgeandtechnologyinan era of globalization.
INTRODUCTION
Aviation has long had a dose, often symbiotic relationship with the state. Decades of direct and indirect
govemment supportfor the industryhave producedan unprecedented level of sophistication in both military
and commercial aviation. Governments have utilized a variety of market intervention instruments to
promotethe diffusion--production, transfer, and use--of aeronauticalknowiedge and technology. Individual
European states--namely France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.)--have impressive histories of
aeronautical innovation; collectively they--namely France, Germany, and the U.K., together with the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Spairv---have collaborated successfully since World War II to rebuild their
indigenous aeronautical capacities under the Airbus Industrie (AI) umbrella. European collaboration to
research, develop, and produce (RD&P) large commercial aircraft (LCA) is all the more remarkable because
they do notshare a common language or culture, but do share an extended history of mistrust and conflict.
Add these obstacles to the incredibly complex task of LCA RD&P, and the enormity of their success
becomes all the more impressive. This paper focuses on the innovation strategies and policies of France,
Germany, and the U.K.; eventually, the analysis will be expanded to include knowledge diffusion strategies
and policiesadopted by the European Union (EU) as well. The intent is to leam which knowledge diffusion
strategies and policiesare efficient,effective, and successful in generating advances in goods and services
nationally in a global economy characterized by mutual dependencies across a myriad of issue areas.
The diffusion of aeronautical knowledge and technology is particularly relevant to this task. F/rst,
both knowledge and technologyare essential ingredientsof the innovation required to create new or improve
extant processes, products, systems, or services which are qualitatively superior or significantly less
expensive than those already inthe market. Innovation, in tum, is deemed critical both to national defense
and to maintaining economic competitiveness in the global economy. In the realm of national defense,
aviation is a keystone of the industrial base which produces the multitude of systems--weapons,
transportation, communications, and infrastructure--as well as the personnel and training necessary to
provide security. Aviation also serves as an economic linchpin, highly valued for its "spUl-over"effects,
either as a powerful force pushing innovation through a cascade of "down-stream" activities, or as a "first
user" of novel technologies. The ddve to attain and sustain military superiority and economic
competitiveness has consistently compelled national governments to support science and technology pre-
commercial research and development (R&D) (Cohen, 1994; Council on Competitiveness, 1994; Dertouzos,
Lester, and Solow, 1989; Julius, 1990; Lopez and Yager, 1987; National Academy of Engineering, 1988;
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Nau,1974;RapldnandStrand,1995;Ruggie,1975;Servan-Schreiber,1968;Strange, 1988; Tyson, 1988;
1992; VanTulder and Junne, 1988; Williams, 1984; Yoffie, 1993).
Thus, aviation plays a special role in the national innovation systems of several of the most
important countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In addition,
for the United States (U.S.), the U.K., and France, aerospace products constitute a major source of
manufacturing exports, adding a trade dimension to the strategic importance of that sector (Council on
Competitiveness, 1996; Gellman Research Associates, 1992; 1990; Hayward, 1994; Nelson, 1993; Tyson,
1988; 1992; U.S. Intemational Trade Commission, 1993; 1984; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991). Governments can use a number of strategiesand policies to promote an industry sector,
a particularproject, or even a specific technology, including financial subsidies, information dissemination,
government mandated technology transfer from foreign sources, technical standards, and government
procurement (Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay and Bishop, 1997, p. 135; Mowery, 1994). More broadly, public
policy establishes the market parameters (e.g., trade and investment rules) as well as the education and
legal (e.g., intellectual property rights) infrastructures within which innovation occurs.
Second, governments and corporations confront an intriguing problem with respect to the diffusion
of knowledge and technok_, neither has intrinsicvalue. Their value lies in their usability; that is, knowledge
and technologymust be accessible by the institutions, firms, or individuals which create or improve military
or commercial processes, products, systems, or services. In addition, knowledge and technology must be
"practicar--relevant and applicableto the goals of producingnew or improved processes, products, systems,
or sentices. Useable knowledge and technologyare embedded with explicit (science) and tacit (engineering)
components;they provide workable and effective solutionsto problems. Generally, technological knowledge
is best utilized by engineers because they have gained the tac/t knowiedge---personal, context-specific,
experiential (see PinelU, Kennedy, Barclay and Bishop, 1997, p. 90; Polanyi, 1966; Bateson, 1973; and
Teece, 1981)-.-.which enables them to deploy knowledge and technology most effectively. At a minimum,
experienced employees who have worked with related materials, processes, and products will benefit the
most from emerging technologicalknowledge;the tacit knowledge they have gained as a result of "leaming-
by-doing" and "learning-by-using =is invaluable as they attempt to innovate using new technologies.
T_d, LCA RD&P and technological innovation share key characteristics: Each is inherently risky
and requires grappling with unknowns that may be technical, economic, or merely the manifestation of
personal and social variables (Rogers, 1982). LCA producers and technological innovators seldom work in
a predictable environment; usually the payoffs are uncertain and distant. In the LCA sector, these
imponderables comprise both "known unknowns"and "unknown unknowns'---referred to as "unk-unks."
Knownunknownsarethe normal,unremarkabteimprovementsthat, it is assumed,
will be called for sooner or later.... Unk-unks are the less predictable
contingencies;the assumptionis that any new airplane or engine intendedto
advancethe stateof the art will harborits own surprisesin the form of problems
that are whollyunforeseen(Newhouse, 1982, p. lg).
Despite this remarkable level of uncertainty, LCA producers and technological innovators must make
decisions and complete extraordinadly complex tasks. To do so they seek data, information, or knowledge
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which will help moderate uncertainty. Hence, examples of successful (or even failed) knowledge manage-
ment--such as we find in the European aeronautics experience---can provide important lessons for
policymakers around the world.
Fourth, LCA RD&P is a knowledge-dependent industry sector the beneFds of which_both tangible
and intangible--are so dearly perceived by government policymakers around the world that virtually every
nation will do what it can to participate in the sector. The question is what kind of intervention is efficient,
effective, and successful.
BACKGROUND
Governmental officials are expected to adopt strategies and policies which they determine will
enable their individual countries to be safe from external attack and to be economically viable. In a world
where knowledge and technologyare increasingly recognized as cdtical to the achievement of both military
security and economiccompetitiveness, policymakers should explore how best to foster the most effective
creation and dissemination of knowledge and technology for and to domestic users. If we define effective
creation and dissemination of knowledge and technology as including the production of an economically
competitive product,then, as we enter the twenty-first century, this task is complicated by the skyrocketing
cost and collateral risk of this laudable goal. In an industry sector such as commercial aviation, the task is
further complicated by the simultaneous expansion of the market to global proportions and the shrinking
number of consumers. Add to this the problem created by the extraordinary cost of LCA to consumers, and
policymakers are confronted withan almost paralyzing dilemma. Can they really expect to support and foster
independent indigenous economic competitors without alienating foreign consumers upon whom they are
dependent and with whom they are competing for sales? If not, how do they join forces with their
competitors so as to enjoy the benefits of profitableproductionwithout undermining the success and survival
of their indigenous capabilities?
European policymakers grapple withjust thisdilemma today. On the one hand, market forces seem
to be compelling them toward greater unity and merging of capabilities; on the other hand, historical and
political forces encourage protection from the vulnerability which inevitably accompanies the mutual
dependencies of integration. The seedlings of this dilemma were first evident immediately following World
War II as govemment officials and corporate decision-makers recognized the potential negative
consequences of parochial state involvement for their own domestic economies in a world shrunk by
increasinglysophisticated communications and transportation systems. The original intervention dilemma
confrontingstate policymakers---findingthe balance between excessive and insufficient government support
of domestic economies--became one of how"toengineer a competitive presence in a full range of industrial
activitieswith instrumentsof public intervention that are not necessarily very effective and that threaten the
well-being of the international economic system" (Shepherd, Duchene, and Saunders, 1983, p. 21). The
need to resolve this dilemma is exacerbated in industry sectors such as transportation and communication
which are natural monopolies if pdvate actorsare allowedto act "freely" in the market (Chandler and Daems,
1980). As the market transitions from domestic to global proportions government and corporate officials
must negotiate a compromise between unilateral and multilateral costs and benef'ds (Golich, 1992; 1991;
Hayward 1994; 1986; Stirk and Willis, 1991).
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AnalyticalConsiderations
FourfactorshelpusunderstandEuropeanapproachestoknowledgeandtechnologydiffusion:FPst,
nations can employ a "mission-oriented" strategy, a "diffusion-oriented" strategy, or some combination
thereof (Ergas, 1987). The former is characterized by large scale project work, centedng on large firms with
a heavy emphasis on defense, nuclear power, and aerospace. The latter emphasizes broader, more gen-
eralized forms of investment, notably in pre-competitive, collaborative research, standards development,
and training. "Mission-oriented" strategies are characteristic of the U.S., the U.K. and France where, since
1945, national defense and prestige have been key national goals. In contrast, Germany adopted a "diffu-
sion-oriented" strategy;Japan adopted a uniquehybdd approach (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop,
1997). The general trend in innovation policysince the mid-1980s, when Ergas introduced the "mission" and
=diffusino" d_on, has been to emphasize diffusionist strategies. To some extent, this trend follows the
end of the Cold War which triggered a shift of resources away from defense programs to a growing
preoccupation with economic competitiveness in a global market (Sandholz, 1992; Peterson, 1993).
Because aviation frequently involves or requires the building of prototypes, the development of
proof-of-concepts, and flight tests (whether civil or military), it stands to benefit from mission-oriented
govemmental support perhaps more than other knowledge intensive, high technology industry sectors. The
largest slice of aeronautical R&D is the 9:)=phase of getting something to work to specification. However,
since the 1930s, development has been predicated on increased understanding of fundamental
aerodynamics (i.e., theoretical and experimental) and the technologies associated with the RD&P of LCA.
Such understanding requires, at a minimum, significant investment in an education system capable of
graduating an aRxoprtately trained workforce, including scientists, engineers, and highly skilled production
workers; research,teslJng,and productionfacilities;and both fundamental and applied research, which itself
may be best facilitated by the productionof =technology demonstrators" to validate basic concepts and better
aid the transition from design to production (European Union, 1992; Rosenberg, 1982).
Second, government intervention in the market vades across at least two dimensions: the level of
intensity--or degree of involvement and direction proffered by the govemment---and preferred style--or
degree of intervention transparency. Policymakers may actively guide and shape their national markets by
creating consumerdemand and by encouragingcommodity supply. Alternatively, policymakers may prefer,
rhetoricallyat least, to remain at arms length and inte_ene only when it is perceived to be absolutely critical.
In addition, govemments can employ a wide range of direct and indirect mechanisms as they seek to
influence both supplyand demand, includingovert funding of R&D, production and sale subsidies, regulatory
relief, tax incentives, enhanced intellectualproperty rights,technical assistance, expedited approvals for new
products,antitrustrules,and so forth. The consequences of each of these policies, as well as many others,
have been studied extensively by others. (For more on science and technology policy choices and
consequences, see Alic, 1986; Chiang, 1993; Cordes, 1988; Ergas, 1987; Golich, 1992; Heaton, 1989;
Logsdon,1986; Mansfield, 1986; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989a; 1989b; Nelson, 1984; Pavitt and Walker,
1976; Rothwetl, 1982; Schacht, 1996). Most European states intervene more aggressively, more frequently,
and with a set of policies that are more transparent than those used by the U.S. (For more on intervention
instruments generally employed by European countries to influence market dynamics, see Gayle and
Goodrich, 1990; Nelson, 1984; Shepherd, Duchene, and Saunders, 1983; Vernon, 1976).
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Th/rd,nationalandregionalhistorieshelpexplainwhygovernmentsadoptdistinctapproachestothe
production,transfer,anduseofknowledge.TheUnitedStatesevolvedintoa =regulatory state" (Johnson,
1982), which, for the most part, focuses on implementing rules to guide market activity and eschews the
establishment of economictargets as a government responsibility. Most modem European states emerged
as political units during the era of economic mercantilism, when wealth and power were each considered
proper ultimate ends of national policy (Golich, 1992; Viner, 1958). The early feudal political structures
common to almost all antecedents of today's European nations obligated the governing elites to intervene
in local economies. The classical liberal economics which replaced mercantilism in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuriesstillarticulateda dear govemmental responsibilityfor providing key infrastructures
to facilitatetrade (Kindleberger, 1978; Smith, 1958). As a result, firms in strategic industries--typically those
related to transportation and communication_were frequently state-owned or were allowed to monopolize
productionand sales; despite the recent trend toward privatizing these firms and exposing them to greater
competition globally, European govemments--individually and collectively--remain quite willing to intervene
openly and assertivelyto achieve economic or social goals. Insofar as the overall goal of European states
is economic growth or social welfare, they can be considered =developmental" (Johnson, 1982).
European governments have adopted two broad categories of technology strategies and policies:
general and selective subsidies (F01ster, 1991; Rothwell and Zegveid, 1981). General subsidies are used
to promote the R&D activities of any firm, whereas selective subsidies target specific projects (e.g., the
creation and maintenance of Airbus Industrie). European govemments have chosen to employ an array of
technologystrategies and policies to encourage innovationfor five reasons: (a) to overcome the disincentive
to invest in R&D whichderives from the fact that firms are seldom able to appropriate the benet'ds associated
with the knowledge and technology they produce; almost by definition, knowledge and technological
innovation is difficultto contain;(b) to spread risk more widely.--across society as a whole---since firms may
be too riskaverse to engage in projects that are costly and have uncertain payoffs, hence govemment has
an _ to assume some or all of the risk; (c) to accelerate the diffusion of knowledge and technology
among firms because to do so will encourage the adoption of profitable new product and process tech-
nologies deemed vital to firm-, industry-, and, ultimately, national-level competitiveness; (d) to increase
retums to scale in R&D by increasing firm size; and (e) to discourage competitive and duplicative R&D at
the firm level. (For a more detailed discussion of these points see F01ster, 1992, pp. 26-30. For more on
levels of competitiveness, see Eden and Molot, 1996; Golich, 1996; Kudrle, 1996; Moore, 1996; Rapkin and
Strand, 1996. For more on the effect of history, ideology, and culture on national approaches to innovation
policy see Brander, 1987; Cemy, 1980; Chandler, 1977; Chandler and Daems, 1980; Chapman, 1991;
Chesnais, 1993; Gillisple, 1980; Gilpin 1988; Golich, 1992; Hoffman, et al., 1983; Keck, 1993; Markovits,
1986; Porter, 1990; Sorge, 1991; Talalay, Farrands, and Tooze, 1997; Underhill, 1997).
Fourlh, policychoices are influenced by the perceptions decision makers hold with respect to their
state's position in the international system (Golich, 1992; Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Ikenberry, 1986;
Katzenstein, 1985; Servan-Schreiber, 1988). Whereas the United States was motivated in the 1980s to
explore the use of policiesto promotetechnological innovation due to a perceived crisis of competitiveness
(Golich, 1996; Kudrfe, 1996; Heaton, 1989; Porter, 1990), Europeans grew concerned with their economic
competitiveness statusas early as the 1960s (see, e.g., Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, 1968; Scherer, 1992; Servan-Schreiber, 1968). Nevertheless, the publication of the "technology
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gap" series of studies commissioned by the OECD (1968) and Servan-Schreiber's The Amer/can Challenge
(1968) triggered an even more aggressive use of industrial and technology policies designed to sustain or
reinvigorate their competitiveness vis-_vis the U.S. (Scherer, 1992). Since 1945, the U.S. has been a world
leader in aeronauticsand, as such, has provided the competitive focus for European nations. Moreover, the
U.S. remains the single most important market for many European and Asian companies--_ fact that condi-
tions many corporate and national technology strategies. Europeans, concerned that they were =becoming
an economic co4onyof the United States" (Thornton,1995, p. 19), recognized =that a broad capability in high-
technology was more than a necessary requisite to military power;, it had become essential to status as a
flint-rote economic power" (Hochmuth, 1974, p. 145). Aerospace was a logical focus for technology policy
because its "strategicpositionextends beyond the obvious military significance of such industries to overall
considerations of international status and predominance in the future deve/opment of science and tech-
nology" (Todd and Simpson, 1985, p. 33; emphasis added).
U.S. aeronautical leadership was obtained by close cooperation between state and industry.
Extensive federal support for production,transfer, and use of aeronautical knowledge and technology began
in 1917 under the auspices of the National Advisow Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It was later strongly
influenced by extensive Cold War military procurement and defense-related R&D, and managed by the
NACA's 1958 mp4acement, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In short, this was
a "mission-oriented =technology strategy par exoellence; it worked largely due to the range, scale, and
overlap of early U.S. civil and military "missions," and to the flexibility of U.S. organizational structures
(Ergas, 198"/). Europeans have consistently sought to remain competitive with the U.S. in key industrial
sectors. In the case of aviation, three factorsmotivated their involvement: F/rst, as in the U.S., it is strategic
to both the national defense and the economy; second, by the end of the 1930s, they had yielded their
position as a world leader in aeronautics to the U.S.; and th/rd, they consider the downstream and lateral
flows of technological discoveries into the broader economy as wall as the upstream technological
developments critical to LCA RD&P, as important elements in maintaining healthy employment.
What followsis an overview of the roles played by France, Germany, and the U.K. in promoting the
production,transfer, and use of aeronautical knowledge and technology relevant to the RD&P of LCA. These
three countries have been selected because of their critical position in the RD&P LCA historically and of
Airbus Industrie aircraft currently. (It is important to note that the many countries which comprise the
European continentdiffer significantlyin histories,ideologies,cultures, traditions, governance structures, and
policyselection and implementation patterns. For discussions of other European national approaches see,
for example, Chiang, 1993; Guile and Brooks, 1987; Hart, 1992; Hayward, 1986; Hochmuth, 1974; Nelson,
1993; 1984; Vernon, 1970).
European Approaches to Knowledge and Technology Diffusion
Like many high-cost,kn_inteflsive industries,aeronautics--and especially LCA production---
have looked outsideof a purely national base for capital and technology. Wdh aeronautics heavily depend-
ent on the flow of "upstream" technological innovation--especially in materials, electronics, and process
technologies--the industry adopted a transnational approach to technology scanning and acquisition
(Rosenberg, 1982). Unable to match the U.S. in market size and R&D base, individual European firms and
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theirgovemmentsponsorswereforcedbybudgetarypressureto cooperateinLCARD&Psincethemid-
1960s.Asa result,Europeanproductdevelopmentinseveralareas--LCA,advancedcombat aimraft, and
satellite launchers--is now based on long-livedtransnatJonalconsortia. With the exception of strategic mis-
sile systems, European collaboration has embraced every civil and military industry sector. Formal cross-
border collaboration is underpinned by a global network of suppliersand subcontractors feeding components,
equipment, and substructures intothe prime contractors in the U.S. and Europe. The recent collapse in de-
mand for military products, triggered by the fall of the Soviet Union, has combined with other commercial
pressures to encourage the development of genuine transnational firms (Hayward, 1994).
The internationalization of aeronautics has created a set of intriguing problems for national
innovation and trade policies due to the complex interpenetration of national aeronautical industry and
technology systems. On the one hand, economic pressures and the globalization of knowledge and
technology combined with the demands of foreign governments demanding partnership agreements as a
price for market access to generate centripetal forces in the industry (Golich, 1992). On the other,
govemments and firms continue to prize technological leadership and the strategic importance of
commanding "firstplace" inaeronautical innovation. This is not always a crudely nationalistic phenomenon:
the position of European states is especially complicated, where corporate managers have acquiesced to
the reality that European industrycompetes against the U.S. in core areas, but where a national edge is still
valued as a means to influence the structure of joint ventures and to maximize individual retums from a
collective effort. As a result, Europe's march toward collaborative RD&P has not been easy (Lorell, 1980;
Stirkand Willis, 1991). As Nelson (1993) observes generally about global trends in technology policy, =there
is a tension caused by the attempts of national govemments to form and implement national technology
policies in a world where business and technology are increasingly transnational =(p.18). Arguably, these
tensions are especially evident in aeronautics where national strategies have to co-exist with, if not
globalization, certainly with the regionalization of industrial and technological capabilities.
France, Germany and the U.K. together account for over 85% of Europe's total aerospace output.
Of the three, France has the largest annual sales followed by Britain and Germany. The Spanish, Italian,
Dutch---now almost entirely absorbed by Daimler-Benz Aerospace (formerly Deutsche Aerospace
A.G.)--and the Swedish industriesmake up the remainder. Only the British and the French can claim a full
scope of aerospace capability, with worldclass airframe, engine, and equipment companies in both the civil
and militarysectors.The Britishboastsuperior capability in civil engines, whereas the French and Germans
have better space competence. Throughout Europe, states and firms share a long tradition of partnership
in aeronautical civil and military development (Hayward, 1994). Governments have involved themselves
directlyin restructuringquestions and, occasionally,in management through public owne_hip of major firms.
What follows is an examination of this relationship: the role government has played in the aeronautical
research and technology (R&T) in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
FRANCE
France has one of the most explicit and aggressive sets of national strategies and policies for
aeronauticsand space development in Europe. These strategies and policies have been in place since the
late 1940s, but were given emphasis and direction by President Chades de Gaulle and have since been
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reinforcedbygovemmentsofboththeLeftandRight.Theapproachreflectsa dearlyarticulatedpolicyof
nationalindependenceinarmsproductionandofamodernized French economy based on developing high-
technology industries(Gilpin, 1968; Kolodziej, 1987); it is grounded on the principle of ditig_sme--a concept
of guided industrial and technological development implemented through a mix of instruments including
central planning (much less important now than in the 1950s and 1980s), state-funded research centers,
public procurement, projectsubsidization,and enterprise capitalization. These technologies aipo/nt and their
associated industrial structures comprise several
stronglycomparbTmfltaltzedsectoralsubsystemsoftenworkingfor publicmarkets
and invariablyinvolvingan al/ance betweenthe State and publicand/or private
business enterprises belongingto the o//gopo#stJcore of French industry.
(Chesnais,1993, p.192)
Evolution of French Technology Strategies and Policies
The devek)pment of science and technology---not to mention a manufacturing base--in France has
long been associatedwith publicpolicy. Colbert founded the Acac_ie Royale des Sciences in 1676 to fos-
ter scient_ capabilities; members of the Acad6mie explicitly linked science and technology to manufactur-
ing. Public policy--4n the name of LouisXIV--(xeated the manufactures (Chesnais, 1993; Crossland, 1975;
Gillipsie, 1980). This connection was reinforced years later during the Napoleonic Wars when the British
naval blockade compelled the French to place science-based innovation in the industrial core. The perva-
sive role of the government in promoting targeted innovations has resulted in a corporatist arrangement--a
triumvirate of govemment, business,and labor. As a result, French private capital only reluctantly supports
entrepreneurship or innovation; such assistance is perceived as the responsibility of govemment.
Napol6on shaped French innovation policy by restructuring the system of higher education which
trained scientists and engineers. After abolishing the university system of the Anc/en R_/me, Napol(_on
reinvented higher education by separating universities from "professional" or technical schools, known as
Grand Ecoles. University students studied the more traditional and esoteric liberal arts. The Grand Ecoles
focused on training experts, so stuOents leamed the results of science, but not the scientific method.
Graduates took jobs as "production engineers who applied existing knowledge, rather than research
engineers who could make substantial advances in the state of the art" (Chesnais, 1993, p. 197). Higher
education was mobilized to serve military and industrial purposes, and France, home to three of the world's
leading scientific institutions---_ de France, the Eco/e Po/ytechn/que, and the Muse_umd'Histoire
Naturelle--became an international leader in science and technology. However, higher education did not
continue to receive the kind of support it needed to sustain this status during the Bourbon Restauration;
"reforms"duringthe Third Republicweakened the system further. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
the divorce of science from industryfor commercial purposes was well established. France had virtually no
industrial R&D laboratories similar in form and function to those proliferating in the United States and
Germany. As a result, few "science-push" industries developed in France. (For more on the evolution of
French science and technology, see Cemy, 1980; Chapman, 1987; Chesnais, 1993; Cohen, 1977; Gillipsie,
1980; Gilpin, 1968; Hoffman, et al., 1963; Kindleberger, 1978; Kolodziej, 1987; Kuisel, 1981; Papon, 1978;
Underhill, 1997; Zysman, 1978.)
Golich& Pine,i--KnowledgeDiffusion'sInfluenceonAeronauticalInnovation 9
BytheendofWorldWarII,France'sindustrialfoundation was in disarray. Technologically back-
ward, small insize, and decimated by the German occupation, the industrial base suffered also from its own
conservative tendencies. As Stanley Hoffman (1963) notes, France was a =stalemate society," where
stability and protection were preferred over growth and competition, a Malthusian fear for overproduction
of material goods and of educated people reigned, and agrarian and religious interests dominated industrial
needs. It was no wonderthat French industry was fragmented and restrained. Following World War II, the
Fourth Republic took immediate steps to reinvigorate industry in general, and science and technology in
particular. In a conscious effort to regain a foothold in the industry, France operated Europe's largest F-86
and B-29 maintenance facility in Chateurault (Samuels, 1994, p. 203). Several agencies were created for
the specific purpose of research and technology in a number of areas, including nuclear power, telecom-
munications, electronics, agriculture, and medicine. The most important of these was the Office National
d'Etudes et de Recherches Adrospatiales (ONERA, the National Institute for Aerospace Research and Stu-
dies), created in 1946 with the mandate to undertake and sponsor both civil and military research.
Another key agency isthe C,erWe NM/ona/ de /a Recherche Scientifique (CNRS, National Center for
Scientific Research). Originally created in 1939, the CNRS was reinvented in 1945 to establish laboratories
and research facilities, to support university research (in pert by seconding science faculty), and to subvene
scientific publications, purchase equipment, and support colloquia on scientific subjects. The CNRS is
expected to evaluate, conduct, or promote all research assisting the advancement of science; to assist in
the authentication and application of research findings; to disseminate scientific information; to coordinate
research development; and to promote national and international collaboration. V_rththe entry of the Fifth
Republic and Charles de Gaulle, greater emphasis was placed on the use of National Champions to regain
and maintain a competitive foothold in the global economy and to achieve independence in national defense.
In many ways, though some effort was made to move certain industrial sectors into the private sphere, the
govemment remained as involved, if not more, than before (Cemy, 1980; Gilpin, 1968).
French Public Policies Affecting the Diffusion of Knowledge and Technology
Today, French strategies and policies affecting the diffusion of knowledge and technology feature
four key characteristics. First, the extent of government involvement in R&D and technological innovation
is significant. More than 50% of the funds expended for R&D are provided by the government. The bulk
of these funds target the aeronautics, electronics,nudear eneqTJ,space, and telecommunications industries.
However, many of the programs and projects undertaken in France are designed and dictated by
govemment officialsand bureaucrats. Government involvement in such undertakings tends to pull decision-
making away from program and project managers, create a rigid hierarchy, foster competition rather than
cooperation,and leadto antagonisticrelationshipsbetween labor and management. As a result, government
involvement intechnological innovationhas produced mixed results. Only two industries--pharmaceuticals
and aviation---can boastthat they contribute positively to the nation's overall balance of trade. (For more on
the structure of R&D, technological innovation, and the diffusion of knowledge and technology in France,
see C,emy, 1980; Chandler and Daems, 1980; Chesnais, 1993; Hoffman, et al., 1963; Underhill, 1997).
Second, since 1945, French technology strategies and policies have been heavily influenced by a
strong linkage to the military, with little concern for generating dual-use technologies. The Ministry of
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Defense,throughitsDe/egatk_ Genera/pour/'_nt (DGA, the Defense Procurement Office) oversees
35% of all French public R&D. It has responsibility (or tute/age) for the space industry's technical and
commercial development, whereas the Ministry of Transport oversees civil aviation programs and airlines
only. The Defense Ministry also has authority over ONERA, which is responsible for about 12% of French
aeronautical research with two-thirds of its funding dedved from government contracts. ONERA is an
interdisciplinary research institute where scientists and engineers work with technicians and highly skilled
workers to advance theoretical, computational, and experimental knowledge. ONERA researchers have at
their disposal all the scientific instruments, technical, and test facilities required both for long-term research
and for development projects concerning fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, missiles, launch vehicles, and
spacecraft. When French firms contract with ONERA, the fee is dependent on the degree to which results
are open to other companies; if they are generally available to industry, ONERA bears the bulk of the cost.
Unlike the U.S., where one agency_NASA---conducts R&T related to both aeronautics and space,
the French have a separate agency--the CentTe National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES)_which performs
space-celatedR&T (Haywa_l, 1994; Kolodziej, 1987; U.S. Congress, 1994a). Recently, French industrialists
have called for more money to be spent on technology demonstrators and research programs similar to
those conducted by NASA and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, formerly the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA). In making their case, they argue that maintaining a
national commitment to defense R&D is vital not only for the future of French military aerospace but also
for the general health of the French aircraft industry (Covault, 1993; Sparaco, 1993; Velocci, 1993).
Since the late 1970s, the French Ministw of Defense has actively sought greater dual-use synergies
from its research. A new directorate, Direction des Recherches, Etudes et Techniques (DRET)---analogous
to the U.S. (D)ARPA though lacking in its flexibility and responsiveness--was created in 1977. DRET has
been charged with coordinating all defense-related work in the public and private sectors (including "dual-
use=technologies), monitoringdefense-related developments inS&T generally, and helping to define French
defense research _ (Adldns, 1993; Sparaco, 1994; U.S. Congress, 1982). DRET has 2000 staff and
funds approximately 200 medium to longterm projectsannually, including some work at ONERA. Like most
of their European neighbors, the French place no legal, regulatory, or accounting barriers to combining
military and civil activities in the same facility. One of the more notable successes of this approach is the
CATIA (computer-Graphics-Aided Three Dimensional Interactive Application) Computer-Aided-
Design/Computer-Aided-Manufacture (CAD/CAM) system, which was first developed by Dassauit and IBM
as part of the Mirage 5 fighter program and later used by Boeing in its RD&P of the prize-winning 777.
British industrialists and policymakers envy the responsibility assumed by the Ministry of Defense for
maintaining the health and vitality of France's defense industrial base. This is understandable given the
neglect shoumby Britain'sDefense Ministryfor doing the same in the U.K. (U.K. House of Commons, 1993).
"rh/n/,a unique feature of French technologystrategies and policies is the concept of the technopo/e
--regional centers of excellence developed to capitalize more widely on public investments in high technolo-
gy programs. Tectmo/x_s were intended to create a "critical mass" of scientists and engineers for a certain
technologyand to stimulate associated knowledge,technology, and industrial development. Mature techno-
po/es were act as a magnet for other high value, high technology industries which would derive advantage
from accessto an increasingly skilled worldorce and a research-dense community. Toulouse, home of the
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Ecole Sup_ieur de I'A_ronautique et de I'Espace (SupAem)---the premier aeronautical Grand Ecole--has
been the main technopole for commercial aeronautics and space-related activities. After World War II, it
became the main focus for civil aircraft programs, including the Caravelle, the Concorde, the Airbus, and
the Franco-ltalian ATR regional transport consortium.
Fourth, an interloddng networkof industrialexecutives and govemment officials--virtually all alums
of the grand dco/es---manage the entire chain of production in France. At the highest level, this can lead
to politically-driven changes in senior management of the state-run enterprises. More importantly, the
consequence of thistightlyknit network is that both sides have a close and detailed insight into the general
direction of technology strategies and policies; as a result, the often rigid and conservative approaches to
innovation in France are reinforced.
In additionto the abbreviated listof agencies noted previously, two deserve mention as recent addi-
tions to the French innovationsystem. The first is the Agence nationale pour la valorisation de la recherche
(ANVAR, National Agency for the Promotion of Research). Funded by the French Ministries of Research
and Education, this national agency for the promotion of research provides technology =diagnostics" tests
to identifythe market potential of products. It also conducts marketing studies and offers legal assistance.
The second isthe Cen#es rdgionaux d'innovatJonet de lransfertde technologies (CRl'l-rs). Created in 1982,
this institution promotes joint and cooperative ventures between pubic and private organizations (Adkins.
1993; Chandler and Daems, 1980).
The Evolution of French Innovation Public Policy in Aviation
In many ways, the history of aviation in France is a testament to the conservative, risk-averse ap-
proach to entrepreneurshipand innovationpreviouslydiscussed. At the same time, however, aviation stands
out as an incrediblesuccess story in at least two time periods: in its earlier years unfettered by government
involvement and more recently as the govemment has shifted from a mission-oriented to a diffusion-oriented
set of strategies and policies, at least in aeronautics.
In its early days, individual entrepreneurs and engineers combined their efforts to launch French
aeronautics and aviation. Their accomplishments are legendary: Frenchmen flying French planes rivaled
U.S. competitors for world records; Farman and Br_uet were net exporters of aircraft; Gnome and Rhone,
Hispano, and Renault were net exporters of engines. Eventually, a combination of very slow economic
growth and an ultraconservative French officer corps depressed demand and the fragmented structure of
competitive firms hampered further development. Aircraft manufacturers confronted a major obstacle to
their advancement: an entrenched pattern of government patronage in industry. French policymakers tded
repeatedly to compel these engineer-entrepreneursto merge into larger companies based on the technopole
logic, but the manufacturersresisted. They preferred to cluster themselves into groupements instead. This
cont-_uration offered individual companies autonomy: within their groupement they could preserve their
ownfixedcapital,productionfacilities, researchlaboratories,and administrative
services. Each group createda central bureauto parcel out ordersto member
firms, negotiatecontracts,and search for foreign clients. In effect the groups
servedmore as marketingcartels.... (Chapman, 1991, p. 37).
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Thisindustrialstructurefellfar short of the genuine concentration desired by French policymakers, but did
carry the firms closer to a unified structure.
L_=onBum's Popular Front nationalized commercial aircraft manufacturers in 1936. Several small
firms mengedto form larger goupement and two prominent engineer-entrepreneurs, Brdguet and Dassauit,
lost their factories. (This pattern followed the government-directed 1932 rationalization of French airlines
into a singlecompany with the French govemment as an important minority stockholder.) As a result of the
German occupation during World War II, French aviation languished until after the war, when the industry
was nationalized again, and government officials used low-cost credit, direct subsidy, import protection,
govemment procurement, and investment finandng to promote LCA RD&P. In addition, firms were =required
to subcontract extensively with one another in order to utilize all production resources" (Hochmuth, 1974,
p. 165). This, together with the groupement structure of industry already in place, helped set the stage for
collaboration in Airbus Industrie.
Since the 1960s, the French govemment has encouraged the formation of several =national cham-
pions=inaeronautics:A6mspatiale in civil airframes, missiles,and helicopters; DassauH in fixed wing military
aircraft and business jets; Socid_ Nat/ona/e d'Etude et de Cons#zctk_ de Moteurs d'Aviation (SNECMA)
in engines;and _F, Dassault Electronics, and Sextant Avionics (a grouping of A6respatlale and
Thomson) in avionics and equipment. All French aerospace firms are entitled to receive launch aid,
production credits, or advanced reimbursables for civil programs; the French govemment also provides
capital infusionsand organizes financial restructuring when necessary. Aid is repayable from sales and has
been up to 100% of costs; more recently, the level has been closer to 50% or less (U.S. Congress, 1991).
Eventually, France added internationalcollaboration to its mix of industrial support. Several factors
combined to impel the French to travel this path. The Algerian War drained the French treasury and LCA
RD&P suffered from the loss of government financial support. Foreign sales and investment were needed
and collaborationseemed an obvious way to generate both. Genmany and the United States were beginning
to dominate aeronautical R&D and the French wanted to tap into that technological expertise. Continental
collaborationwas viewed as a means of drivinga wedge between the United States and the United Kingdom.
FinaBy,the French feared its aemnauUcal firms would suffer from a rationalization process occurring in the
industryat the global level which would relegate them forever to the status of component suppliers (Golich,
1991; Lorell, 1980).
Typically, the French seek leadership roles in intemational management consortia such as Airbus
Industrie. In the case of the latter, the French heavily promoted Toulouse as the center for Airbus final
assembly and commercial exploitation, and resisted strongly, though unsuccessfully, German demands for
a final assembly of all new nanow.bodied transports. Most French collaboration has had a European focus;
however, the French partnered with the United States' General Electric Aircraft Engine Group (GE) to build
civil engines despite the "natural" link with the British firm, Rolls Royce (RR). France's SNECMA joined
forces with GE to build the highly successful CFM-56 family of aircraft engines (I-layward, 1986; 1994). On
projects such as Concorde, Airbus, and the CFM56 engine, French industry benef'dted from working with
equal or superior partners in the U.K. and the United States.
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Currently,Frenchtechnologystrategiesandpoliciescanbecharacterized as a blend of mission and
diffusion orientation. Informed by policymaker perceptions about France's global status_particulady v/s-_-
v/sthe United States, butalso with respectto potentialContinental competitors---and by historical precedent,
French publicpolicieshave consistentlyand carefully (if not always successfully) promoted specific projects
in strategic industrysectors. They have done so to achieve multiple goals. At the most obvious level, these
policies have been designed to generate an original product---e.g., the Airbus Industde aircraft. In addition,
the French have quite openly sought to gain and maintain a leadership position in certain high technology
industriesbecause they recognize beth the spill-over effects into downstream industdes and the critical pull
effect for upstream industries. Finally, the French have consciously aspired to satisfy social and economic
welfare goals with their strategies and policies. In particular, they have sought to create and maintain high
technology, high wage jobs. To achieve these ends, French public policy has employed transparent inter-
vention tools, includingeducation, urban planning, subsidy, ownership, and a vadety of protections against
foreign competitors. Judged simply by the leading role played by French companies in so many major Euro-
pean aerospace programs, France's national aviation and space-related technology strategies and policies
would have to be considem<l a success. For example, in 1974, when the first Airbus aircraft was shipped,
management's stated goal was to capture one-thiKIof the LCA market; by 1995, after a shaky beginning and
an uncertainperiod through the late 1970s, Airbus held roughly30% of the market; a year later, Airbus' claim
to market share had increased to nearly 33% (Abeulafia, 1997, p. 43; Proctor and Sparaco, 1997, p. 371).
GERMANY
Unlike France, Germany has pursued =diffusion-oriented" technology strategies and policies, with
little emphasis on defense R&D relative to that given to commercial R&D (Becher and Ag, 1993; Keck,
1993). The German govemment has provided support for a research infrastructure and training since the
late 1800s; post1945 prohibitionsreinforcedthese structural patterns. Since World War II, both the federal
(Buno_and state (/__nde_ governments have funded programmatic research activity. At the federal level,
govemments from boththe Left and Right have supported a sedes of high-cost projects including Airbus and
space-related activities. Lclnderhave complemented this assistance with their own promotion of technologi-
cal innovation;for example, the Bavadan government has backed aerospace and automotive industrial de-
velopment. Since the mid-1960s, Germany has pursued a well-conceived strategic approach to aerospace
R&D encompassingits three main sectors--<:ommercial, military, and space. The pdmary aims were to ob-
tain the competitiveand broadereconomic benefits perceived to be associated with aerospace, and to defray
the costs of German defense commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Regional in-
terests were also served by supporting aerospace centers in the north and south of Germany (Hayward,
1990). More recently,German aerospace has struggled to absorb and to modernize the limited capabilities
of the former Deutsche Democrat/sche Republik (DDR, or German Democratic Republic).
Evolution of German Technology Strategies and Policies
Germany became a unified political unit rather late in the game. While France, the U.K., and the
U.S. were consolidating national identity, Germany still consisted of individual territories, each complete with
its own laws, currency, weights and measures, taxes, and custom tolls. Even after merging to form the Ger-
man empire in 1871, the Bundexercised authontyover very few functions, such as foreign policy and nation-
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aldefense.Theformationof theGermannation-statewasinfluencedsignificantlybyeconomiconcems.
To enable German industry to catch up with the industrialized countries--particularly Britain and France---
Fdedrich List proposed a customs union which would protect "infant industries"from stronger competition
(Keck, 1993; Tickner, 1987). From this beginning, Germany proceeded to acquire by virtually any means
possible--espionage, immigration, procurement of machinery, and education--the knowledge, technology,
and skilled workers needed to move from an agrarian to an industrial economy.
Germany successfully adopted the French university system of the early nineteenth century as a
primary focusof scientificresearch. Supported by a network of institutes with laboratories for the natural sci-
ences, as well as specialized libranes for the humanities, university research quickly elevated Germany to
world leademhip in medicine, chemistry, and physics. However, little was done in the realm of engineering.
Recognizing the value of skilled technicians to industrialization, the Prussians established a system of
polytechnical schools, which stressed the use of the scientific method and mathematics, to train research
engineers and engineeringtechnicians. By 1870, these schools--called Technische Hochschulen--had as-
cended to a status nearly equivalent to univem#ies. "Bythe beginning of the twentieth century Germany had
established a sophisticated system for education in scientific, technical, and commercial matters, reaching
from elementary schoolto the doctoral level" (Keck, 1993, p. 122). The system graduated more engineers,
engineering technicians, and scientists--relative to the size of its populationlthan France, and attracted
students from around the world.
In addition to federally-provided higher education, German/Jnder established 40 to 50 institutes
for specialized research in a number of applied areas, including weather and atmosphere, geography and
geology, shipbuilding, and hydro engineering. Building on that tradition, the Bund established the Imperial
Instituteof Physics and Technology (Physikalisch-technische Reichsanstalt) in 1887, to work on standards
and measures for the development of precision instruments, a pattern that was replicated across many of
the science diSdl_nes. Yet another mechanism to finance fundamental and applied R&T was based on the
U.S. model of tapping industry for research funds: The Kaiser-Wilhelm-Society (precursor to the Max-
Planck-Society created in 1948) used resourcesfrom industw and govemments---inciuding real estate, sala-
ries, and subsidies--to finance both basic and applied research in chemistry, physical chemistry, coal
research, biology, and experimental therapy (Keck, 1993).
By the beginningof the twentieth century, Germany was the envy of many other industrialized and
industrializing states. Taking advantage of its position as a technology follower, Germany adopted new
technology from abroad and moved it to useful production efficiently and effectively. Though seriously
disrupted by World Wars I and II, Germany had created an impressive system of knowledge diffusion---a
variety of highereducation opportunitiescoupled with multiple research venues--which enabled its firms and
industries to create new or improve existing processes, products, systems, and services as advances in
science and technology became available. (For more on the structure of R&D and technological innovation,
and the diffusion of knowledge and technology in Germany, see Allen, 1987; Becher and Ag, 1993; Hart,
1986b; Kuster, 1974; Meyer-Krahmer, 1990; 1992; Schimank, 1988; v. Massow, 1983; Wamken and
Ronning, 1990; Wortmann, 1990).
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GermanPublicPolicyAffectingthe Diffusionof Knowledgeand Technology
ThediffusionofknowledgeandtechnologyinGermanytoday--stilldecentralizedamongindustry,
theBund, and the L='lnder--is part of a broader industrial policy which is embedded in a "general economic
policy aimed at maintaining full employment with stable prices, balanced foreign trade and satisfactory ex-
pansion" (Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development, 1971, p. 27). Public policy focuses on
maintaining a system of highereducation and facilities, as well as engineers and scientists, who can conduct
the basic research necessary for technological innovation. The system benefits from the public provision
of a research infrastructure, including data networks, university chairs for computer science, hospital re-
search groups,and genetic research centers. Financial subsidies are limited to social needs (environment,
health, and climate), to key sectors of national or European technological and economic competitiveness,
and to long-term development of scientificand technical knowledgeand technology (Schmidt-Ki_ntzel, 1993).
Tax incentives have also been employed to encourage appropriate industry-level R&D.
The Bundesministerium for Forschung und Technologie (BMFT, or Federal Ministry for Research
and Technology)_the primarysource of R&D funds inGermany---does notsubsidize individual firms through
direct projectfinancing. Instead, it finances specific technology developments, with support not exceeding
50% of development costs. The BMFT fosters the diffusion of knowledge and technology among German
universities, research institutes,and industry, and links technology-oriented enterprises and research estab-
lishmentsby (a) sponsoringinternshipsin R&D institutionsfor young industry scientists and engineers to help
develop their sldllsand their (tam and explicit) knowledge base; (b) partially funding R&D contracts to small
and medium firms; (c) providing incentives for collaborative research in contracts to universities, R&D
institutes,and industry;,(d) helpingfirms pool pre-competitive data, information, and knowledge; (e) creating
links and alliances between suppliers and usersof specialized inputs; (e) fostering inter-firm communications
about knowledge and technology that exist outside their companies; and (f) establishing centers of excel-
lence to serve as =honest brokers" and provide neutral and independent data, information, and knowledge
to industryin an effort to reduce the uncertaintyand risks associated to the introduction of new technologies.
Occasionally, BMFT offers "indirect-specific"incentives to speed up the diffusion of knowledge and techno-
logy transfer to particular industrysectors (Bruder, 1983; Humphreys, 1989; Keck, 1993; Kreile, 1978; Meyer-
Krahmer, Gielow, and Kuntze, 1983; Meyer-Krahmer, 1981; Schmidt-KLintzel, 1993).
Schmidt-KQntzel(1993) outlinesthe cuwentGerman diffusion infrastructure: F/rst, universities and
their research institutes(primarilysupported by Lander), the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPG), and the Deut-
sche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Association) 0ointly financed by the Bund and
conduct most of Germany's basic research. Largely autonomous, they have established a solid re-
putationfor German science. Second, the National Research Centers (GFE) receive 90% of their support
from the federal government and 10% from one or more host Lander. Originally created for nuclear re-
search, they nowwork on applied energy R&T, particles research, as well as information, communications,
production,and processtechnologies. Th/rd,the Fraurgx)ferGese#scha# (FhG, Fraunhofer Society), created
in 1949, is financed by the BMFT and industryat a 60:30 ratio. FhG institutes actively work to diffuse know-
ledge and technology. VV'_ its linksto universities and industry, the FhG helps reduce the gap that opened
inthe German innovationsystem when the Max-Planck-Society moved toward basic research. Fourth, mul-
tiple science foundations modeled on the orderof the Rockefeller Foundation (e.g., the Volkswagen Founda-
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tion),complementgovernmenteffortsby providing seed money for new or unorthodox initiatives. Fifth,
German industrial firms and organizations finance 86% of their own R&D.
The Evolution of German Innovation Public Policy in Aviation
Inthe early days of aviation, Germany (and Holland) challenged France for superiority. Germany
partnered with Anthony Fokker---after the British and the Dutch governments rejected his aircraft sales
offer--in an expliciteffort to build up its militaryarsenal leading up to World War I (Lederer, 1985; Middleton,
1986; Weyl, 1965; Winter, Byshyn and Clark, 1969). Between wars, German aerodynamicists and
engineem, prohibitedby the Treaty of Versaillesfrom building airplanes of more than 100 horsepower, tumed
to gliders to leam valuable lessons in aerodynamic structure that later benefitted German aircraft design
(Winter, Byshyn, and Clark, 1969). Germany also continued its collaborative work with Fokker and
established firms to work on aircraft in other countries. Thus, in 1925, when finally permitted to conduct
passenger operation, Germany was the only country with new generation aircraft; other European nations
had concentrated on converting militaryairplanes into commercial planes. Once the treaty restrictions wore
dropped, Germany's aviation industry became a thinly disguised military machine.
From 1945 to 1955 Germany's aircraft manufacturing sector virtually ceased to exist as new treaty
requirements forbid =flying even model airplanes, much less gliders" (Winter, Byshyn, and Clark, 1969).
When Germany re-entered the LCA production sector, it first tried to move from licensed co-production to
indigenous programs. Explicit govemment support for commercial aviation began in 1962 and was
separated from militaryR&D withthe Ministryfor the Economy exercising authority over the former, and the
Ministry of Defense over the latter. Eventually, R&D costs and market size problems forced Germany to
adopt internationalcollaboration as a strategy to sustain indigenous production. This led to participation in
each of the major European aircraft projects--including Airbus and the Tomado bomber--and significantly
increased German industrialcompetence, especially in airframe and engine technology. Most of Germany's
recent collaborative ventures have been with European partners, but since the early 1970s, the Germans
have supportedEuropean links and allianceswiththe U.S. on space programs. The German aircraft industry
is also working with Rockwell International on the NASA-funded X-31 demonstrator program.
Substantial weaknesses in Gemuan equipment and avionics capabilities remain, largely attributable
to the lack of German-led programs and the dominance of British and French firms in the more technically
advanced aspects of major collaborative programs. For example, in 1993 and 1994, when the Experimental
Fighter Aircraft (EFA) development ran into problems, German inexperience with systems design and
integrationwas blamed. Recently, German policymakers have taken a more aggressive line in demanding
access to higher value design and more demanding industrial responsibilities. These ambitions wore
undedined by the formation of Deutsche Aerospace A.G. (DASA) as a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz, one
Germany's most important manufacturing companies. Renamed Daimler-Benz Aerospace, DASh, was
created through multiple mergers of German aircraft and engine manufacturers and the acquisition of the
outstandingsharesof the Netherlands' Fokker Aircraft. This restructuring brings together under one roof the
bulk of German airframe, missile, engine and avionics activity; the other main aerospace companies are
Siemens in avionics and BMW in engines.
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Governmentsupportfor aerospace has been channeled through defense procurement, a growing
space budget, and repayable launch aid for civil programs. Public funding is provided through the BMFT,
the German research establishments, the Deutsche Forschungsantalt f_ Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR) for
aeronautics, and through research conducted by universities and other institutions. The German Ministry
of Defense onlyfunds research for specificmilitary progra_ measure designed to prevent the distortion
of research priorities by national security. The DLR is specifically remitted to support high risk, long term
aeronautical R&D. Over half of its funding comes directly from the BMFT budget, with the remainder provid-
ed under industry or govemment contract (U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, 1994).
Government financial support for German aerospace was hit by the downturn in defense spending--
up to 60%--since 1990. In common with other major European aerospace states, German aerospace is
dependent on large scale military programs such as EFA to generate many of the advanced technology
concepts that underpin its overall capabilities. Budgetary priorities associated with reunification have also
ledto reductionsin space and general aeronautics R&D budgets. Nevertheless, support for LCA RD&P has
grown by 63% since 1981, with the bulk of the money going to Airbus Industrie. The German government
has pledged to spend $738 millionfor civil aeronautical research between 1995 and 1998. The commitment
was based an eight-point plan for the industry published in November 1993, which called for
• a multilateral GAIT agreement;
• strict enforcement of the existing GAIT agreements;
• creation of a new support structure for R&D;
• a separate aeronautical research program under the European Union Framework program;
• maintenance of minimum defense industrial capacities;
• support for satellite technology investment;
• retention of more air force overhaul work in Germany; and
• promotion of a wider public understanding of the importance of aerospace technology and its
contribution to economic growth ('Facing the Cdsis," 1994).
Althoughsome doubts linger regardingGerman willingness to support expensive aerospace programs indefi-
nitely, (given the continuingcostsof unification),clearly both government and industry want to increase Ger-
many's role incollaborative programs and its influenceover the future of European aerospace. For example,
German determination to increase its share of the Airbus program_especially to obtain final assembly
responsibilities---has been fueled, in part, by its desire to reduce the industry's defense dependence.
Germany's diffusionistapproach is firmly grounded in the assumption that targeted access to advan-
ces in knowledgeand technology benefits the nation and its economy. The approach is reinforced by a his-
tory of direct government involvement bothin the economy and in knowledge and technology diffusion. The
success of this approach is perhaps best manifested by Germany's remarkable economic recovery following
World War I1. Even with the adjustment problems triggered by the reunification processes still under way,
Germany's economy remains the keystoneof the European Union. It has a well-deserved reputation for the
meticulousRD&P of fine automobiles, electronics,and pharmaceuticals, and has made impressive advances
along the steep learning curve of LCA RD&P. its participation in Airbus Industde signifies and supports
continued advancement along this curve and generates important economic and social welfare benefits.
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THE UNITED KINGDOM
Like France, the Britishgovernment has played both direct and indirect roles in the industry's devel-
opment, and its involvement has typically been characterized by a mission-oriented approach. However,
in contrast to the more consistent approaches to innovation in France and Germany, British technology
strategies and policieshave vacillated in intensityand style, reflecting oscillations in its public policy general-
ly that have accompanied changes in government. Though the resulting uncertainty and volatility have
wreaked havoc at times in commercial aviation, the United Kingdom is still one of the wodd's leading aero-
space countries, ranked second in Europa (behind France) in terms of sales. In addition to a major LCA
engine finn---Rolls Royce--and a prime manufacturer of smaller regionalaircraft---British Aerospace (Bae)--
Britain is home to globallysuccessfulequipment and avionics industries. The U.Kospends much of its pub-
licly-funded R&D on defense with a strong emphasis on aerospace. A separate research budget supports
civil aemnautk:s, and a range of state-assisted research facilities--now consolidated in the semi-privatized
Defense Research Agency (DRA)--fosters both civil and military R&D.
Evolution of British Technology Strategies and Policies
The evolution of any conscious technologyslz-ategiesand policies inthe U.K. is fairly short compared
to other OECD states, and was precipitated largely by World Wars I and II and the Cold War. Until shaken
by these traumatic events, early successes at achieving political stability--at least since 1688--and econo-
mic prosperity--as manifested by its longstandingpositionas the global economic hegemon and its "first mo-
ver" throughthe IndustrialRevolution--provided little incentive to change. The British adopted political and
economic liberalismsequentially--not simultaneously as inthe United States (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay,
and Bishop, 1997, Chapter 2)--and avoided the violent upheavals which defeated feudalism in countries
such as France or Germany. As a result, tradition and ritual associated with many "pre-capitalist elements
of deference and truculence"embedded in such enduring cultural conventions as the monarchy and the aris-
tocracy have proven remarkably resistantto change (Desai, 1989, p. 302). For example, the Industrial Rev-
olutionof the eighteenth centurywas launched by religious dissenters who were shoved out of university ed-
ucation and turnedto pursuethe "practicalarts"of engineering and science in their own "public"schools; the
landed, capital-rich adst_ucated in ancient languages and philosophies--played a relatively insigni-
ficant role. Still, to thisday, the lattertypically comprise the goveming and corporate elite, whereas the wor-
kern and researcherscritical to production and innovation come from the middle-classes. (For more on the
historicaldevelopment and continuinginfluence of Britain's culture, see Burke, 1986; Chandler and Daems,
1980; Desai, 1989; Gilpin, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1987; Sen, 1984; Walker, 1993; Wiener, 1981).
As a "first mover," Britain was not initially threatened by the industrialization efforts undertaken by
its continental neighborsor colonial possessions. Its empire spanned the globe providing massive markets
for the new goods produced; except for its role in acquiring and maintaining these territories, the state has
been notably absent in the evolution of technological innovation. Until recently, the British government's
economic rolewas pdmadly confinedto some regulatoryfunctions--e.g., financial markets and property law
---and to the advancement and military protection of foreign trade. Unlike the governments of France and
Japan, the British state has not acted as an entrepreneur itself. When it did take more aggressive and
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transparentstepsto influencetheeconomyingeneralandcommercial aviation in particular, the learning
curve for effective intervention was painful and steep (Hayward, 1989; 1983; Walker, 1993).
Because early industrialization occurred despite govemmental neglect and in the absence of any
kind of technology-focusededucationalor innovation system, few policymakers presumed such an infrastruc-
ture was needed. Unfortunately, the culture and institutions that first sparked and then sustained industrial
development in the late 1700s and early 1800s proved inadequate for the new industries that emerged in
the late 1800s and later served to underpin economic advance throughout the twentieth century; for them,
.scientificunderstanding and methods informed---sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciouslyn
criticallyimportanttechnological advances. To make matters worse, the early successes seemed to breed
eventual failure insofaras industrialand governmental leaders became obsessed with defending rather than
expandingtheir markets and territories. At the same time, the power of organized labor increased as mana-
gerial authority and competence weakened. Ultimately, of course, the spread of industrialization to other
states--which, as late comers, generally recognized more clearly the value of technological innovationn
developed competitors and eventually undermined Britain'shegemonic position. Ironically, Britain aided and
abetted the process by exporting its capital and technology and maintaining an open international trading
system (Gilpin, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1987; Landes, 1969; Mackinder, 1904; Sen, 1984; Stein, 1984).
British Public Policies Affecting the Diffusion of Knowledge and Technology
The hallmarksof Briti_ publicpoliciesmeant to influencethe diffusion of knowledge and technology
are instability,vacillation, and lack of coordination between state and market actors. These characteristics
derive largely from =theviolent doctrinal swings that have occurred in British governance,= but also from
belated "reactions, and olten overreactions, to the perceived failure of policies during the preceding period"
intended to arresteconomic decline (Walker, 1993, p. 187). Four key factors have affected the development
and implementationof technologystrategiesand policies,suchas they are. First, like France and the United
States, the U.K. has generally pursued a "mission orientation" to knowledge diffusion driven by perceived
militanj needs. Defense procurementabsorbsthe largest portion of high technology engineering resources.
The consequences for Britainhave been largely negative. W'dh a relatively weak technology skill base, the
emphasis on military R&D has resulted in little spinoff into the civil sector. This is exacerbated by the fact
that, even though there are few boundaries within individual firms with regard to transferring military
technology to commercial projects, Britain's Ministry of Defence, unlike the Pentagon in the UoS. or the
Dd/c_a_on C_ndra/e pour r_ in France, resolutelyrefusesto take responsibility for the development
of technologiesthat are nottied to specific defense needs (Kaldor, Sharp, and Walker, 1986; Kaidor, 1982;
Advisory Council on Science and Technology, 1989; Walker, 1993). The specialized needs of the military
begets what Kaldor (1982) calls "baroque technology" with little relevance to the commercial sector. And,
finally, firms with technological capabilities are lured away from risky, market-oriented ventu_n the
absence of public support--toward the guaranteed profits associated with military contracts.
Second, the educational infrastructurein Britain is not adequately designed to graduate highly skilled
engineers and productionworkers as well scientists. A formal education system did not even exist in Britain
until the late nineteenth century; as in France, university education focused on the more traditional and
esoteric liberal arts. Since the 1960s, a number of reforms have been implemented, however, British
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educationremainselitist.Accessisdeterminedmorebywealthandclassstatusthanbytalentorability;as
aresult,asmallerproportionofyoungpeoplemoveintoanykindofhighereducation.Britainpossessesno
equivalentoftheFrenchGrand Ecoles or Polytechniques or the German Technische Hochschulen to train
engineers, scientists,technicians, and managers; consequently, the "output of skilled manpower is lower at
all levels in Britain than in France and Germany" (Walker, 1993, p. 179; Prais, 1988).
7h_, the Britishinnovation"system"lacks effective coordination among the various players. Britain
possessesfew, if any, "bridging" institutions similar to Germany's Fraunhofer Geseflschafl; scant producer-
user linkages exist within any indusl_jsector.--even aerospace where such connections are a near universal
characteristic; Bdtishindusffial management tends to be hierarchical and better suited to small enterprises;
and virtually no coordination between banks and industrial enterprises exists.
Fourth, Britishinvestment in R&D has been consistentlyunimpressive. Public expenditures on R&D
in the U.K., though relatively highthroughout most of the post-war period, ware not very effective, and they
have declined dramatically sincethe 1970s; inaddition, spending on basic research has been relatively low.
WYdlmost of the fundingfocused on defense, little was left to support commercial developments. As public
funds vanished, the private sector was expected to step up to the plate. British policymakem---influenced
by a neo-liberal ideology which advocates that industry alone should decide which technologies to bring to
market and should carry the associated risks as wall--have emphasized the need for greater "value-for-
money'; in doing so, they have "diverted attention away from the large-scale, collective, and resource-
intensive nature of much contemporarytechnologicalactivity,"and failed to recognize the risk-averse nature
of firms when faced with lengthy and uncertain retum-on-investment cycles (Walker, 1993, p. 186). (For
more on the characteristicsof Britain'sinnovationsystem, see Caimcross, 1992; Chandler and Daems, 1980;
Desai, 1989; Freeman, 1989; Hayward, 1989; 1983; Jones, 1985; Young and Hood, 1984).
Following World War II, British policymakers perceived a need for greater public involvement in
technological innovation. Direct R&D funding, laboratories and other research facilities, public procurement
intended to create new production capabilities and spawn new or re-create older industries--in particular
nuclear and ae_ all adopted as partsof a transparent industrial policy. Research associations
designed to pool corporate resources ware encouraged with matching public funds. During the 1980s, the
National Economic Development Council (NEDC), a creature of the Labour Party, served as a forum for
labor, corporations, and government to develop science and technology strategies. By the 1970s,
policymakers ware disillusioned by the ineffectiveness and often damaging effects of British government
programmatic intervention in the market. Though fluctuating between Conservative and Labour Party
governance, public policy began to shift back to its more traditional laissez-faire approach to the economy.
By the 1980s, the transitionwas complete. Margaret Thatcher was in power;,state-owned enterprises
ware privatized; the government sought to reduce public expenditure in general and R&D expenses in par-
ticular by passingoff both costs and benefits of risky investmentsto the pnvate sector. Budgetary allocations
were centralized within the Cabinet Office; its Advisory Committee on Science and Technology (ACOST)
became the focal point for S&T conversations, with an emphasis on competition, entrepreneurship, and
decentralized decision-making. The only exceptionsto these trends were continued commitments to defense
R&D and to Airbus Industde-related launch aid. Local Enterprise Agencies and science parks--products of
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jointventuresbygovemment,business,financialinstitutions,anduniversities---appeared;starved for capital,
these entities have mostly sought to make themselves attractive to foreign investment.
By the mid-1990s, the U.K. had fallen behind its European neighbors in terms of public support for
aeronautical research and technology acquisition (R&TA). Even R&TA funded through the defense budget
has declined, reflecting both general trends in defense spending and changes in procurement philosophy.
Corporate contributions to defense research and demonstrator programs have risen from a typical 15% in
the late 1980s to at least 35% in 1993; in some cases, programs, once funded completely by the Ministry
of Defence (MoD), now receive private support of roughly 30-40% (House of Commons, 1993). As the gov-
emment distancesitself from industrysupport, Britain is becoming increasingly integrated into the European
innovationsystem. For all intents and purposes, the U.K. has ceded its leadership in aeronautics and com-
mercial aviation to France and is dependent on foreign investment to finance technological development
(Adkins, 1993; Hayward, 1994; Patel and Pavitt, 1990; U.K. House of Commons, 1993; U.K. Parliament,
1965; U.S. International Trade Commission, 1993; Walker, 1993).
The Evolution of British Innovation Public Policies in Aviation
Britain'scommercial aviationdevelopment followingWorld War II reflects its ambivalence about the
proper rolefor govemment in the market; =responsibility for project choice, monitoring and control was left
in limbo between a full, free-market private-enterprise system and state interventionism" (Hayward, 1983,
p. 36). The British were among the first to recognize aviation's potential strategic value; they rejected a
freedom-of-the-air doctrine proposed at a 1910 international law conference which was grounded in Hugo
Grotius' 1604 freedom-of-the-seas principle. They favored recognition of sovereign air space above national
terntodesand acted decisively to safeguard theirs by empowering the state =to regulate the entry of foreign
aircraft and to proscribe zones over which foreign aircraft were not allowed to fly" (J0nsson, 1981, p. 271).
The European continent quickly followed suit (Cooper, 1947; 1952; Golich, 1989; JOnsson, 1981).
As Britishaviationtransitionedfrom small, competitive, engineer-entrepreneurs to big business, the
government supportedthe industry via procurement from a =magic circle" of manufacturers; the intent was
to sustaina =strategic reserve"of pdvate firms by guaranteeing a constant flow of income from state-owned
airlineswhich were requiredto "BuyBdtish'-manufactured aircraft (Hayward, 1983, p. 4). Dudng Wodd War
Ii, the government established an aviation review committee, chaired by Lord Brabazon, to develop and
implement a plan to exploit the British advantage deriving from their discovery and development---con-
currently with, but obviouslyseparately from, the Germans--of jet-engine technology. Despite a bias against
detailed government involvement in the market, the committee literally designed nine transports, known as
the "BrabazonTypes," and then requiredBritishaircralt manufacturers to build them. The option of pursuing
licensed production with U.S. manufacturers--preferred by most industry managers-was consistently
rejected by government poUcymakers (Golich, 1991; Hayward, 1983; 1989).
Following the war, four factors continued to influence U.K. public policy toward aviation:
(1) thepersistentbeliefthat civilaviationwas criticalto bothnationalsecurityand
economicrecovery;(2) a sense of inferiorityvis-a-visthe UnitedStatesrelatedto
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Britain'sheavyeconomicindebtednesstoitsAtlanticAlly,coupledwiththeconvic-
tionthata revitalizedcommercial aircraft industrycouldrepresenta resurgentand
autonomousBritain,lessdependenton its former colony;(3) a large aerospacela-
bor pool;and (4) the postwarLabourgovernment'sideologicalcommitment to a
planned,centrallydirectedindustrialandeconomicrecovery(Golich, 1991, p. 129).
Unfortunately for Britain's LCA manufacture_, this period of govemment involvement was ineffective at bast
and hamfful at worst. Insensitiveto the complex nature of market forces, public policymakers defined speci-
fic product outcomes rather than supporting general technology advances. British airlines were caught in
the middle: They were required to *Buy British"as an "honorable legacy of the waY' (Hayward, 1983, p. 15),
but doing so meant they were unable to compete in the global market--where most of the traffic could be
found--because passengerssoughtthe betterquality service provided by other (mostly U.S.-manufactured)
LCA. A series of governmental inquiries led to a variety of imposed changes in the way business was con-
ducted in the industry---ranging from forced collaboration between airlines and aircraft manufacturers, to
revised versionsof*Buy British,"to excessive reliance on parochially-influenced, airline-determined specifi-
cations--.but none were successful. The rocky road from little or no, to excessive, to ineffective, full circle
to little or no govemment involvement that bedeviled technology innovation strategies and policies in gener-
al, also plagued policies directed at aviation. (For more on the mercurial relationship between government
and industryin aviation, see Cooper, 1947; 1952; Desai, 1989; Golich, 1989; 1991; Hart, 1986b; Hayward,
1983; 1989; Hochmuth, 1974; Jones, 1985; J6nsson, 1981; Shepherd, Duchene and Saunders, 1983;
Walker, 1993; Young and Hood, 1984).
Current Structure of British Aeronautical Knowledge Diffusion
Three agencies support aeronautical R&D in the United Kingdom: the Ministry of Defence, the De-
padxnentof Trade and Indusby (DTI), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). In addition govemment
agencies fund more general R&D---not necessarily aeronautical---in universities and research establish-
ments. The U.K.'s DoT funds R&D activities intended to solve problems related to the public interest, such
as aircraft safety, noise and environmental pollution, and aviation secunty.
The MoD is the U.K.'s primarysponsorof public aerospace R&D---including aeronautical research--
for both civil and military use. The Royal Aerospace Establishment.the Aerospace Division of the MoD's
Defence Research Ageno/--conducts most of Britain's aeronautical research. Funded by MoD contracts
and by I]ivate industryrevenues, the DRA operates in a commercial fashion and does not receive institution-
al support from the British government. Because the DRA competes with industry for DTI aeronautical re-
search contracts,a potential conflict of interest arises with respect to sharing data with firms. The extent of
direct technologytransfer into the public domain depends upon the terms of individual contracts. The con-
tract mechanism is seen as a means of increasing the efficiency of DRA operations, but it has given rise to
fears that the DRA will neglect long term research (U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, 1994). Al-
though the DRA has introduced procedures designed to speed up transferability of defense technology into
the civil sector--and there are few institutional barriers between defense and civil aerospace activity at the
level of the firm--British companies regularly complain that data do not reach private industry fast enough
and several U.K. corporate officials have argued that the MoD should let more of its contracts directly with
industry (U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, 1994; U.K. House of Commons, 1993).
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TheDTIprovideslaunchaidforcivilaeronauticsprogramsguidedbytwokeyprinciples:First, up
to 60% of non-recurring R&D costs may be financed; however, aid or guarantees for production is seldom
provided. In theory,all aid---plus interest---must be repaid from levies on sales; nonetheless, few programs
have fully repaid their launch aid, though receipts from royalties have outpaced grants for the last three
years. Second, to receive aid, a project must be demonstrably viable in commercial and technical terms,
but riskyenoughthat a company would not otherwise pursue the project. In theory, launch aid is available
for equipment firms, but none have received any since the 1950s (Hayward, 1983). All of BAe's major Airbus
projects since 1978_A320, A330, A34G--have received launch aid, as has RR's investment in the RD&P
of the RB211 engine family, whereas neither RR's Trent high-power engine nor BAe's R&D of a new range
of regional jet airliners has.
DTI also funds civil technology R&D and research facilities to enhance the British aeronautical
technology base through its Civil Aircraft Research and Demonstration (CARAD) program, which focuses
on long term, pre-competitive research for airframes, propulsion, and avionics (U.K. House of Commons,
1993; U.S. Congress,General Accounting Office, 1994; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
1991; U.S. InternationalTrade Commission, 1993). DTI's CARAD budget declined dramatically over the last
ten years promptingthe development of a National Strategic Technology Acquisition Plan (NSTAP). Pub-
lishedin 1993, the final report identified three categories of research which should inform government and
industry R&TA activity over a 10-15 year span, including
• technologies fundamental to the future well-being of U.Ko industries from which the critical
competitive edge will emerge---the =crown jewels" technologies which provide an independent
capability or an influential role in global ventures;
• enhancingtechnologieswhich will improve the effectiveness of U.K. industry, and without which
the potential of U.K. firms will be damaged; and
• supporting technologies mainly imported from other industries without which the U.K. will be
severely disadvantaged in the long term (U.K. House of Commons, 1993).
NSTAP also recommended ways of improving the efficiency of U.K. R&TA spending. In particular, British
R&TA hadto be placed within a clearly defined national strategy for the aerospace industry and to identify
how Britain couldmake the best use of international, especially European programs. Finally, NSTAP urged
the adoption of a number of technology demonstrator programs that could act as a focus and catalyst for
near-market research (House of Commons, 1993).
The NSTAP exercise helped to inform Bntish approaches to technology planning generally. In an
echo of the Japanese, MITl-led =visions" (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop, 1997, Chapter 18), the
U.K. has launched a =Foresight" exercise to help identify key technologies for the next two decades. =De-
fence and Aerospace"comprisesone of the Foresightpanels. Over a period of several months during 1994,
the Foresightpanels gathered evidence from industrialists, officials and academics on opinions and insights
about aerospace technologyand market needs upto 2015. The results will be used to guide budgetary plan-
ning for government and industry R&D.
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Despitethisflushof "stmtegic-thinldng,"British industry still faces a net decline in public funding for
civil aerospace R&TA over the next few years. Moreover, the DRA may now be more market-driven than
is good for the health of the UoK. aerospace industry. The potential problem is magnified by the potential
=squeeze out"effect of "mission-oriented"commitments to defense and to aerospace (Walker, 1993). In this
respect, a decline in public spending in these areas, with an accompanying shift of resources to "diffusion-
oriented"strategies might be welcome. However, given that defense and civil aeronautics constitutes one
of the few areas of world class Britishmanufacturing,the resultanttransition costs could be high. Worse still,
the current U.Kogovernment is reluctant to make the necessary commitments to a training and research
infrastructure which would be needed to implement an effective diffusionist strategy.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the orderof magnitude change in our daily lives wrought by innovation rooted in knowledge
and technologicaldiscovery, little has changed in the underlying concepts which guide government policy-
makem in their interactionswith other nations. Indeed, "the policy processes dealing with science and tech-
nologyand the enterprisesthat encompass them remain predominately national, even if progress in science
and technology and in their applications inexorably moves toward intemational and even global effects"
(Skolnikotf, 1993, po27). Government policiesinfluence the nature of technology that emerges within nation-
al boundaries; moreover, public policies are still intended to serve the objectives of the state, whether fo-
cused on military, economic, political, social security, or some combination of purposes.
Public policies and strategies which target knowledge diffusion are the product of national history,
culture, and perceived needs. Hence, they influence the nature of technological change. Thus, it is critical
to reflect on the match between articulated governmental goals and the policies and strategies used to
achieve them. For example, no approach to knowledge diffusion is without its faults. A mission orientation
tends to be too focused on a single goal--usually national defense--which may or may not have value for
the broader economy. Such an approach is more susceptible to the problems associated with "picking win-
ners and losers." There is less room for the market to evaluate targeted projects because the govemment
has mandated that the project be pursued, has sunk significant resources into ensudng it is sought, and is,
therefore, reluctant to change course. Usually, by the time a project is determined to be a loser, the cost in
every sense--financial and human capital, social welfare, economic extemaUUes--_ significant. Occasional-
ly, as in the case of the Concorde, market failure and the associated financial costs are somewhat compen-
sated for by the derivative benefits of leaming to manage a transnational project of immense complexity and
sophistication (Hayward, 1994; 1993; 1986). More frequently, government involvement pulls decision-
making away from program and projectmanagers, creates a dgld hiemmhy, fosters competition rather than
cooperation, and leeds to antagonistic relationships between labor and management. Despite these prob-
lems, the French, British, and UoS. experiences have demonstrated that a mission orientation can yield
significantsuccesses. Airbus and the ¢onsteilationof French aerospace firms---including Ad_ospatiale, Das-
sault, SNECMA, and Thomson-CSF, Dassault Electronics, and Sextant Avionics--and British firms_BAe,
Rolls-Royce, and several key component suppliers--have delivered impressive products which have enjoyed
significantmarket success. Boeing's success is dearly evidenced by its overwhelming and persistent dom-
ination of the LCA market.
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A diffusionapproach does notallow for as much controlor directionby the government as a mission-
oriented approach. Because a diffusion orientation is not tied to a specific, measurable outcome--e.g., a
family of new generation LCA--_t isdifficultto assess itssuccess. A diffusionistapproach requires significant
up-frontand on-going public investment in research, testing, and production facilities; in educational, train-
ing, and research institutions;in a research and technologyinfrastructure replete with incentives for collabor-
ation among industry,academic, and government research facilities; and in financing technology develop
merits. Much like LCA RD&P, a diffusionistapproach is risky business; it is expensive and carries uncertain
and distant payoffs. Nevertheless, the benefits of such an approach to knowledge and technology diffusion
seem to outweigh its costs. Because it facilitates communication and coordination among researchers, it
has a greater potential for eliminating potentially costly duplication of effort while encouraging the kind of
cross-disciplinaryintellectual stimulation that can lead to dramatic knowledge and technology discoveries.
What is dear is that govemment intervention in support of knowledge diffusion is a pervasive char-
acteristicof the twentieth century (Lazonick, 1991). No single approach will work for all countries. The range
of optionsforgovernment interventioninthe market is significant when one considers the mission-diffusion,
direct-indirect,opaque-transparent overlappingcontinua. Whatever approach is adopted, policymakers are
well-advised to be dear and open about why and how they plan to implement it. Such open discourse ena-
bles policymakers to negotiate difference and manage potential conflict.
Even though no singleprescril_on will t'it all national or industry sector needs, it does seem safe to
conclude that new technologies, enhanced organizational capabilities, and more efficient production pro-
cesses--such as those broughtto LCA RD&P by Airbus Industrie in Europe and by Boeing in the UoS. (see
Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop, 1997, Chapters 1 and 2)---are critical to the creation of valuable
goods, processes, and services for the market. Whereas =public authorities can help firms respond to these
pressures by providing a technological infrastructure to facilitate innovation by individual producers,"
(Majumdar, 1987, p. 515), such efforts must transcend sector-specific public policies. Under conditions of
global oligopoly resulting from large economies of scale and barriers to entry,
the moredominanthe existingorganizationsandthe greaterthe capital investmentsrequiredto enter
the globalindustry,the morenecessarywill it be for a nationalstrategyto giveprivilegedaccessto
public resourcesto those nationalbusinessorganizationsthat can best developand utilize these
resources.(Lazonick,1991, p. 88)
Even if countries are more open about their interventionto promote knowledge diffusion, we are still
confronted with the tension between national advancement and the market forces in high-cost, high-tech-
nology industriesimpelling us toward globalized RD&P. Alter all, for much of recorded history, competition
has been one of the most important forces driving scientific research and technological development. Ri-
valry between nation-states has been particularly important in this regard. Many significant developments
in transportationand navigation, communications, and especially weaponry originally grew out of the efforts
of one country to gain some military or economic advantage over its neighbors (or to prevent its neighbor
from gaining such an advantage).
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A global RD&P structure, much like transnational strategic alliances among firms, requires a certain
level of trust and communication among participants which speaks against the kind of free riding which is
implicit in seeking collaboration for the purposes of national advancement (Lorall, 1980). The past two de-
cedes have witnessed a dramatic shift toward collaboration, particularly during the research and develop
ment (R&D) phases of critical projects. The rise of the "global economy," the "transborder reach" of many
new technologies, the rapidly growing costs associated with a number of R&D activities, the end of the Cold
War which eased concerns about the vulnerability potentially associated with transnational collaboration ap-
pear to weigh more heavily new than the old competitive forces still in place. The rise of transnational R&D
collaborative projects represents a change of historic magnitude, and every indication suggests it is a trend
that will continue well into the twenty-first century (Golich and Kay, 1997).
This transfonTtation is not without significant irony. For example, following World War II, European
governments sought to dominate civil aviation unilaterally because of its perceived strategic value; they pur-
sued that goal with heavy state involvement. Eventually, market forces propelled a variety of transnational
joint ventures among firms as well as a pooling of scarce research, human, and financial capital in govem-
mental research agencies.
Another irony emerges as private-sector cooperation begins to achieve success. To facilitate further
private-sector growth by making transnational ventures even more efficient and effective, state officials must
coordinate government functions such as harmonizing standards for the safe a_l competent operation of
a commercial aviation production and transportation system (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop,
1997, Chapter 2). This can lead to the creation of supranational governmental authorities, such as the Joint
Airworthiness Requirements Authority. Eventually the network of private and public activity becomes so
complex and intertwined that the beginnings of a new political organization emerges. In any case, for the
foreseeable future, one of the primary challenges confronting government and corporate decision makers
is how to negotiate the tenacious tension between national priorities and global imperatives.
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